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REVOLUTIONARY JUDO

Let R, A, P, denote three parties to a revolutionary conflict: Rebels, Authority, Public.\* An early phase of many such conflicts has these characteristics:

R wants to destroy A, but isn't strong enough. It must borrow strength: where? From P. But P doesn't want to give it, at a price -- in cadre effort, in resources devoted to propaganda, threats, rewards or punishment -- R can afford. Given reluctance in P, R's limited arms and manpower aren't enough to coax or coerce all the help it needs. And outside support, if any, is too small.

P must be induced, somehow, to help much more. If R is to succeed, P's attitudes and preferences must change: toward willingness to give R the assistance and assets it needs for growth, not necessarily free, but at a cost in effort and resources that R can meet.

But just as direct coercion is costly -- beyond R's present means, on an adequate scale -- changing P's attitudes, too, takes energy, takes assets and manpower, takes time: perhaps a decade or a generation, if R must do all the work. To show results on R faster, R must still get help: where? From A.

A?

It is A that has the assets, and the "reach," to change mass attitudes more quickly. It is A, only, that can touch the lives of enough people deeply enough to "change their hearts and minds" in a few months or years. It is A, not R, that has radios to broadcast edicts, propaganda, threats, and promises; a large budget to distribute; multitudes

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\*This follows the usage invented by Wolf and Leites in Rebellion and Authority, R-462, (Chicago 1970), p. 4. The symbols R, A, and P will often be used, for convenience, as if the groups referred to were individuals. Actually, of course, each has a structure of subgroups as well as being a collection of varying individuals; all of which is highly relevant to a more detailed analysis. "R" refers to full-time, or at any rate, active and "disciplined" members of the rebel organization, "A" correspondingly to members of the government and its armed forces, "P" to all other members of the population.

of representatives -- officials, soldiers, and police -- to transport them; masses of troops and police, heavy firepower, prisons, with which to threaten and punish; and services to withhold. All these, depending how they are used (and what they actually do) can change attitudes, lots of them, quickly.

There is the situation. With new attitudes in P -- then, with P providing more help for R, and less for A, for given inducement and effort by each -- R could grow from its small beginnings, press A increasingly, perhaps win. If A used its strength in ways that moved P's attitudes, favorably to R's needs, it might get the job done, so R could destroy A; otherwise, R may have no chance. What hope does that hold out for R?

Enough, it often turns out. Time and again, A's do just that.

When historic grievances against A and positive appeals for sympathy and loyalty to R have not left P responsive enough to meet R's needs for growth, A steps in to help. Its own actions, during the conflict and stimulated by it, prove crucial in their practical effects to losing the war or becoming enmired in costly stalemate.

A's soldiers, howitzers, bombers, serve to recruit more enemies than they kill. A's prisons become schools for subversion. A's police activities generate more silence and secrecy than information about R. The more A's propaganda is distributed, the more widely A is discredited. And so on: all this on vastly greater scale than R's dedicated cadre could perform on hire.

A's political failure in these cases is not, mainly, that its policies, if any, intended to win hearts and minds are weak or ill-chosen, but that other actions (and some of these too,) are so effective in antagonizing people, hardening hearts against A. It is not, mainly, that R's ideals, and long-range aims command wide positive sympathy in P but that more and more people, in moods from apathy or irritation to rage and despair, are made willing by A's own actions to provide help to enemies of the state.

In achieving crucial -- unintended -- "cooperation from A, many insurgent forces have thus relied successfully upon a strategy that can be called "revolutionary judo"\* in which, exploiting a stronger opponent's political responses to various feints, threats, and provocations, his own strength and momentum are used to unbalance and overthrow him.

Sometimes, R brings this about deliberately: knowingly harnesses A's energies to its own ends, manipulates A's actions to work on P in a way disastrous to A. But the concept and the strategy do not depend on R's intending or controlling the process from the very outset. A's actions to the effect above may result from deliberate, self-conscious, provocative initiatives by R; or they may not. In other cases, all it takes is for R to exist, posing a threat. Sometimes not even that: A presses policies to this effect without any initial stimulus from R. For example, A may act to crush elements of P that oppose both R and A, managing in the process to antagonize the rest of P and to eliminate R's rivals for opposition leadership.

Actions by A can be "counterproductive," ultimately serving R's interests and working against A's, in a great variety of ways.

Some of these have nothing to do with attitudes or with A's relations with P. For example, A may be led (perhaps in part by R's offensive feints) to allocate most military effort to large "search and destroy" operations in unfavorable terrain on remote borders, at the expense of pacification efforts and defense of populated areas (as perhaps, in South Vietnam in 1967; VC attacks at Loc Minh and Dac To in the late fall may have been intended to maintain and reinforce this Allied deployment to the borders, just prior to the Tet Offensive).

Or, a mounting scale of military conflict will often lead A to

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\* "Judo (ju-jitsu) ... a Japanese system of wrestling in which the strength and weight of an opponent are used against him by means of anatomical knowledge and the principle of leverage." (Webster's New World Dictionary); "self-defense without weapons in using an opponent's strength and weight to disable or injure him." (Webster's Collegiate Dictionary.)

give primary responsibility for all intelligence to the military, which proceeds to emphasize tactical intelligence and enemy order of battle, to the crucial neglect of anti-conspiracy intelligence best understood and handled by a professionally developed police Special Branch.

All such "self-defeating" patterns, stimulated and/or exploited by R, might be regarded as instances of revolutionary judo. But we will consider here almost exclusively a narrower category: actions by A that serve to affect attitudes adversely, that alienate or antagonize individuals or groups within P or external supporters of A ( $X_A$ ), or that demoralize members of A itself.

This emphasis reflects two beliefs on the part of the writer. First, that this class of actions and effects are relatively, grossly, neglected both in most analytical discussions and in governmental policies addressing the political aspects of insurgencies. Second, that these phenomena are, in fact, central to the evolution of many important insurgencies, in at least certain critical phases.\*

These phases are, in particular, the early stages ("Phase I") of recruiting cadre for a revolutionary apparatus and later in moving into and building up during "Phase II," widespread guerilla operations.

An R capable of surviving and moving into Phase II could often, with great validity, perceive its main tasks in the following terms:

- (a) The primary aim of Rebel policy in all its aspects is to affect political attitudes in P so as to (1) lower

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\* The first judgment of relative neglect of this subject must be read against this estimate of the importance of the phenomena. Although I know of no comprehensive analysis, even on the scale of this beginning effort, many discussions of insurgencies do include examples of the pattern of behavior described here, and a few of these have made passing references to "judo" or a comparable term to describe it. (My own introduction to the concept was from Edward G. Lansdale, under whom I served in Vietnam: mainly in the context of proposals, rarely adopted, that "judo" tactics be used against the insurgents). But very few of these given any hint of what I believe to be the dominant importance of these matters in certain periods -- including 1956-65 in South Vietnam (discussed below -- both to the actual source of events and, potentially, to policy).

the costs of survival and operations to R, and above all, (2) to raise the costs to A of suppressing R, and governing to a level that will be infeasible for A, and unacceptable to A's external support.

- (b) Political attitudes can, in general, most easily and effectively be moved thus in favor of R not by "winning hearts" to R, but by generating hostility to A. (Conversely, the critical problem for A is not well described as "winning hearts" to itself, or winning them "away" from R, but in containing and reducing hostility to A.)
- (c) How is such hostility to A to be generated? To a large extent, this is most effectively achieved not by using the direct, small resources of R in propaganda, terrorism, or political activity upon P, but by "revolutionary judo," utilizing the strength and activity of A itself. In other words, the key strategy for R is to operate in such a fashion as to stimulate and provoke, and/or exploit, activity by A itself that will alienate the population from A and create a viable and increasingly favorable environment for R.

#### JUDO AND PRIOR ANALYSES OF INSURGENCY

The period during which judo may be critical corresponds to the period in which, in David Galula's distinguished analysis, an attractive "cause" is essential to R:

"The first basic need for an insurgent who aims at more than simply making trouble is an attractive cause, particularly in view of the risks involved and in view of the fact that the early supporters and the active supporters -- not necessarily the same persons -- have to be recruited by persuasion. ... The importance of a cause, an absolute essential at the outset of an insurgency, decreases progressively as the insurgent acquires strength. The war itself becomes the principal issue, forcing the population to take sides, preferably the winning one."\*

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\*David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare (New York, 1964) pp.18, 25.

But what sort of cause will do? Galula's discussion suffers, from the present point of view, from less specificity on successful rebel causes than actual experience supports. He suggests that R can be eclectic, picking among grievances and positive programs and appeals, and switching as appropriate; he fails to point out that historically certain of these -- specifically, strong negative motivations, hostility to A, X<sub>A</sub>, a colonialist or invader -- have worked much better for Rs than, say, positive appeals alone.

"Thus, in China, the Communists initially took the classic Marxist stand in favor of the workers (1921-25). Then they actively espoused the rational cause of the Kuomintang, for the unification of China against the warlords (1925-27). After the Kuomintang-Communist split, they largely dropped the workers in favor of the poor peasants, advocating land reform by radical means (1928-34). Then Japanese aggression became the central issue in China, and the Communists advocated a patriotic united front against Japan (1937-45), adopting meanwhile a moderate agrarian policy."\*

What needs adding to this account of Communist flexibility, surely, is that the earlier choices, stressing positive appeals (pro-worker, pro-KMT, pro-peasant) produced only limited growth and led twice (1927, 1934) to disaster at the hands of the Kuomintang. As Chalmers Johnson has emphasized, neither guerilla tactics nor radical land reform mobilized enough popular support to bring the Communists in sight of victory until Japanese behavior (not merely Japanese presence) had aroused intense and widespread anti-Japanese motives among Chinese peasants.\*\*

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\* Galula, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

\*\* Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power (Stanford, 1962), pp. . See also, "Civilian Loyalties and Guerilla Conflict," World Politics, XIV, July 1962, p. 656:

"However, as Mao's own long experience shows, no matter how well a leader perceives the nature of guerilla tactics, his movement will flounder until he has a mass following. Mao Tse-tung was writing on guerilla warfare as early as 1927, and the Red Armies in the Kiangsi Soviet were noted for their exemplary employment of his guerilla methods; yet the Kiangsi Soviet was crushed in 1934. It was not until after 1937 that Mao's movement was able to capitalize upon his insights into guerilla tactics; and then it was based on widespread

Johnson generalizes this point to the flat assertion:

"The condition upon which guerilla warfare is predicated is that the civilian population is regarded by the defending force as neutral but is, in fact, hostile to the defending force... It is this presence of an overtly neutral but covertly engaged population that provides the "ocean" in which the "fish" maneuver and hide, thereby crippling the stronger force and depriving it of the advantages of occupation...

The willingness of the population to support the guerillas depends upon the intensity of its hostility to the guerillas' enemies; it is not necessarily related to the ultimate goals of the guerilla leadership -- e.g., to the establishment of a Communist or other nation-state, or to the carrying out of a broad-based social revolution. The population will support the guerillas if it is convinced that the guerillas are operating effectively against the enemies of the people: e.g., agents of a tyrannous or economically unjust government, foreign invaders, or colonial troops. The actual mobilizing influence is the hated condition -- the presence of foreign troops, economic exploitation, and so forth -- that alienates the population from the formal authorities."<sup>\*</sup>

This passage is cited not to defend it here in detail: the major theme of the recent Rebellion and Authority by Wolf and Leites is criticism of any such predominant emphasis on popular support and attitudes, and they could undoubtedly score some points against a literal reading of these assertions. What is most pertinent to the argument here is its focus on R's negative appeal, to hostility in P against the opponent.

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Communist-peasant collaboration against the Japanese, which was ultimately strong enough to overwhelm the Nationalist government in 1949... the crucial development was the achievement of a mass basis during World War II." (Italics added).

As some critics have pointed out, Johnson may underestimate the role of other factors in the final growth stage -- e.g., the distraction of the KMT to fighting the Japanese, and the remaining positive appeal of Communist land policies -- but there seems little dispute that the anti-Japanese cause was the primary basis for the expansion of population in "liberated zones" under Communist rule, as estimated by Mao, from 9 million in 1934 to 95 million in 1945 (ibid., p. 657).

<sup>\*</sup>"Civilian Loyalties," pp. 657-58 (italics added). This remarkably suggestive article -- one of the most stimulating in the literature of insurgency -- published in early 1962 has no mention of the conflict in South Vietnam. It seems all the more persuasive when read against the record of the last twelve years' experience in that country (see below).



In the same vein, Johnson notes of T. E. Lawrence, whom he cites:

"The foundation of Lawrence's strategy against the Turks was to mobilize... the ill wills of all the Arab peoples, combined with the active hostility of a few zealots!"\*

Suppose this general emphasis is valid: how is the hostility to Z on which R must rely to be achieved? On this Johnson is less explicit, or even misleading, in drawing implications from his own examples. References to the hated "conditions," to "the presence of foreign troops," to "peasant nationalism," suggest that attitudinal responses to structural features of the situation, to the "nature" of the opponent rather than (as with judo) to his actions, an adequate basis for P's support of R. And this might be so, in given instances. Yet it does not appear to be true of almost any of Johnson's own numerous illustrations, which, instead, show repeatedly the outlines of judo in the clearest possible form. That is, hostility to A is described as emanating not simply from A's character or national or social origins, but from A's alienating actions against R and P undertaken during (not before) and in response to the conflict with R. Unremarked by Johnson, this pattern holds even for the cases he cites where A is a foreign invader.

"Similarly, in Wingate's campaigns against the Italians in Abyssinia, the mass or irregulars, led by English soldiers, were Abyssinians who had engaged in guerilla harassment of the Italians since the collapse of the main Abyssinian forces in May 1936. Italian reprisals, insults, and dislocations of the traditional Abyssinian way of life gave rise to a mass mobilization..."\*\*

"Guerilla units in Malaya were formed (as in the Philippines) in response to the Japanese invasion. Japanese persecution of the Chinese, together with a conscious policy of pitting the Malay population against the Chinese, gave rise to a wholly Chinese guerilla resistance movement. The guerillas did not succeed in gaining support across the ethnic division... In 1948... the Chinese villages on the edge of the jungle again

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\* Ibid., p. 649; David Garrett, The Essential T. E. Lawrence (New York, 1963), p. 100 (italics added).

\*\* Ibid., p. 649, italics added.

supported the guerillas, this time in the belief that they were defending Chinese rights against British pro-Malay policies."\*

In both these cases, Johnson (citing additional authorities) describes hostility growing not from a "condition" or a "presence" but from a pattern of behavior by A; the implication in the case of Malaya is that resistance was mobilized only in that segment of P that felt threatened by the occupying policy, although both the Japanese and the British stood in the rôle of foreign occupier equally to Chinese and Malays. Johnson also alludes to the well-known case of Nazi repression of the Soviet partisan movement despite initial receptivity in the Ukraine.

Above all, in his major work, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, Johnson contradicts the implication of his title and of summary statements like "...the Communist rise to power in China should be understood as a species of nationalist movement" (in the sense that "the Party became a mass movement in the context of resistance to a foreign invader during World War II"),\*\* which suggest an automatic, instinctive reaction to what A is, rather than what he does, a response in P owing nothing to actions either by R or by A. Such a response would not involve judo. But the history that Johnson actually recounts is a classic tale of judo, of which only a few aspects and instances can be cited here:

"The role played by the Japanese Army in bringing the Chinese Communists to power has never been fully appreciated by foreign observers. In addition to their mopping-up campaigns and reprisals against the civilian population, which accelerated the process of rural mobilization, there were other activities of the Japanese that further strengthened the position of the Chinese Communists. For example, the Japanese unwittingly advanced the Communists' claim to national legitimacy by singling out the Communists as their special enemies and by giving puppet regimes the special task of Communist 'extermination.'

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\* Ibid., p. 659.

\*\* Op. cit., pp. ix, viii.

Conversely, the cavalier treatment of the Chungking government in Japanese propaganda tended to weaken Chungking's attempts to guide and control the resistance behind the Japanese lines; and thus it also aided the Communist cause."

"...Prior to 1937, the population of North China was more willing than the Chinese of other areas to countenance a Japanese-sponsored government; the Japanese actually possessed such a potential for popular support in the rural areas that, according to Michael Lindsay, they could have succeeded if they had only taken the trouble to shoot a few hundred of their own officers! In actual fact, the devastation and exploitation that accompanied the Japanese invasion produced a radical change in the political attitudes of the northern Chinese. The peasants of north China gave very strong support to Communist organizational initiatives during the war, and the largest number of Communist guerilla bases was located in the rural areas of the north."\*

Johnson elsewhere underlines the implication that peasant mobilization was not, after all, a simple response to invasion or to foreign occupation but to the specific style of occupation behavior adopted, by contrasting developments in north China to those in central China where a less repressive "policy of establishing Model Peace Zones was pursued... and the population was led to believe that cooperation with the Japanese was a viable alternative. Over the course of the war, the policy in central China achieved a much greater measure of success."\*\*

In short, the "peasant nationalism" on which the Communists eventually rode to power, far from being "structural," was created during the conflict by the actions of the Japanese opponents. "The Japanese Army itself explained the rural pacification drives as having been provoked by Communist activities"; yet these activities in turn benefited from conditions of rural anarchy created still earlier by the Japanese invasion and from Japanese terrorism in the villages.\*\*\*

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\* Ibid., p. 31. The chapter of which this is the opening page, "The Japanese Role in Peasant Mobilization," would repay detailed exegesis as a case-study of varieties of judo.

\*\* Johnson, "Civilian Loyalties," p. 651.

\*\*\* Peasant Nationalism, p. 49.

"Prior to 1937, the peasants were a passive element in politics; even the earlier Communist bid for power, based on an appeal to peasant economic interests, was a conspicuous failure. The prewar peasant was absorbed in local matters and had only the dimmest sense of 'China.' Japan's invasion changed this condition by heightening the peasant's interest in such concepts as national defense, citizenship, treason, legitimacy of government, and the long-range betterment of the Chinese state. This came about as a result of certain specific new pressures on Chinese rural society that were contributed by the Japanese Army.

First, and most important of all, was the hostile activity of easily identifiable foreign soldiers against Chinese soldiers and civilians in north and east China. Although the peasantry, on the eve of war, was no more opposed to the Japanese than it was to other authorities, it acquired anti-Japanese attitudes as a result of the behavior of Japanese troops and the failure of Japanese leaders to offer a better alternative than resistance or slavery. If anti-Japanese feelings were not created by the invasion itself, they were created by the 'mop-ups' -- which were aimed directly at the peasantry. Japanese military activity in the rural areas compelled the Chinese peasant to join with other activated peasants for the common defense."<sup>\*</sup>

The critique by Wolf and Leites of analyses stressing politics and attitudes -- "hearts-and-minds theories," in their terms -- fails to meet head-on the main arguments in the passages above or in the present paper; P's hostility to A as the main source of R's support, and (implicitly in Johnson, explicitly here) A's own responses as the main source of P's hostility.

As in many of the discussions they criticize, Wolf and Leites tend to think of the attitudes allegedly underlying public support mainly in positive terms of "ardor, sympathy, preference, loyalty, identification." In their summary chapter, they identify as their "principal theme":

"Perhaps the most general point that recurs in the book is this: for R to win, it need not initially have the spontaneous support, sympathy, or loyalty of the people, not even of a significant minority of the people, ... Moreover, even fairly far along in the struggle, R can make substantial progress without substantial popular endorsement..."<sup>\*\*</sup>

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<sup>\*</sup>Ibid., pp. 69-70.

<sup>\*\*</sup>Op. cit., p. 149 (italics in original).

It should be clear from our discussion so far that one can take attitudes very seriously in insurgent conflict without confronting, in a particular case, any that can be identified naturally as "sympathy" or "loyalty." There is also, after all, rage, hatred, humiliation, alienation; such feelings are the stuff of the present analysis. But the summary, like most of the text, treats these, by omission, in parallel fashion. The authors leave attitudes and attitude change behind to assert, as their main positive point:

"Thorough organization and effective coercion can enjoin or engender particular modes of behavior by the population, notwithstanding popular preferences that would lead to different behavior if a purely voluntary choice could be made."\*

To this, in principle, one can only agree. Yet the perspective it offers, as a proposed vantage point from which to survey and understand, predict or control insurgent and counterinsurgent phenomena, is clearly at sharp odds with that of this paper. Where did the paths diverge?

For one thing, Wolf and Leites regard the attitudes underlying support for R or A as relatively unresponsive to manipulation through programs and policies, at least in the short run, especially by A. Dealing with "preferences, attitudes, and sympathies of the populace... in the less developed countries involves the massive problems of modernization," which are, beyond question, "apt to be unyielding in the short run."\*\* But is this really to the point? Obviously, the authors are not thinking here of the immediately counterproductive, hostility-provoking tactical choices by A on which this paper focuses: in principle avoidable, stoppable, remediable even in the short run by an enlightened A, the sort of practice that can lose wars by its effects on attitudes yet to which the relevant solution may not be massive "modernization" but (as suggested rather drastically above) shooting a few hundred of one's own officers.\*\*\*

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\* Ibid., p. 149, italics added.

\*\* Ibid., p. 29.

\*\*\* This is not to say that such an initiative is easy either to conceive or carry out; it might even be argued that it would require

Another point of difference is that the discussion in Rebellion and Authority seems to underrate (despite passing references) the impact of attitudes and attitude change on the relative costs and effectiveness of coercion and other activities by R and A.

Whether A (or R) is to get a particular desired action from a member of P by a threat, by a promise of reward, or by an act designed to evoke or strengthen a "political attitude" (a feeling of loyalty, of obedience, identification, alliance, friendship, sympathy, hostility; an association of a particular action with a feeling of guilt; shame, anxiety or self-esteem) it will have to "pay" for what it gets. Thus, questions of optimal strategy choices comes down to "cost-effectiveness" of different actions by A or R in using its limited resources to achieve a desired type and scale of public participation.

For both R and A it is costly, in terms of time, administrative structure, effort, resources and attention, to influence either individualistic incentives (the forces of Rebellion and Authority) or political attitudes so as to produce desired behavior. Threats, indeed, may not have to be carried out if they are effective; yet a process of influencing behavior by making credible threats is still expensive in terms of resources for surveillance, "bookkeeping," communication and enforcement. (These requirements are so high, in fact, that very few non-Communist A's in less developed countries have the practical ability to run very efficient "police states," no matter how willing the spirit. Communist states, on the other hand, do achieve highly effective, coercive capabilities, not merely because they are more efficient at it but because they devote relatively enormous resources to the task.)

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"massive modernization." Nevertheless, the fact was that Japanese practice did differ, simultaneously, in the separate commands in central and north China, suggesting that the southern practice was available as an option in the north, short of vast cultural change in the Japanese Army. And, taking troop discipline and behavior toward the population very seriously as a central political problem, the Philippine Ministry of Defense under Magsaysay achieved massive change in performance of the Philippping Army without transforming the larger society, by measures short of mass executions; see Valeriano and Bohannon,

Both in the small -- "can we get enough local help to carry off an attack against this company outpost, safely and effectively? -- and in the large -- "can we expand enough in the next year to start effective Phase II guerilla operations?" -- R must ask the questions: "What is the cost of achieving the public cooperation needed? How much effort, time, cadre, armed strength, administrative apparatus will be needed to induce it?" If either threats or promises are to be used, how big must they be, how credible must they be, and what efforts and actions are needed to make them that credible to the particular audience?

Some coercive incentives will typically be needed for the large-scale participation required. And so far as any one individual is concerned, R can presumably bring enough material incentives or risk of harm to bear to determine his behavior. This is the "every man has his price" postulate, on which Wolf and Leites implicitly rely heavily. But experience tells us that what the price is depends not only on the man but upon what it is he is being asked to do, who is asking him, and who he is being asked to do it to. (The U.S. Government pays even its draftees, but not very much. The cost of foreign mercenaries can be a great deal more: see the Congo, and Third Country forces in Vietnam. And even the U.S. Government can find, to its surprise, that it is not paying draftees enough to induce all of them to take part in what some see as an "unjust war" against an ambiguously-regarded opponent.) Above all -- the argument of this paper -- the price can depend on what these various parties have done to him, lately.

What is surely true, as Wolf and Leites have it, is that individualistic incentives -- not only material benefits, but security, prestige, power, recognition -- will figure in a large majority of the actions taken in support of R (as of A). Only a small minority of actions, in other words, will be chosen by any that cut against every measure of personal interest for him. But to emphasize such individualistic considerations, and their manipulation by A and R, as the overwhelming influence on choices, as Wolf and Leites tend to

do, is to ignore the enormous variation (and the possibility of change) in the strength of personal incentives needed to outweigh a given degree of bodily risk to the individual associated with a given act.

Indeed, even a high degree of sympathy or identification with the cause of an organization, or hostility to its opponent, is commonly evidenced not by action undertaken in its support despite the absence of any personal incentives, but in one's willingness to take some risks of death or major harm on the strength of only small or moderate personal incentives. All the attitudinal factors mentioned earlier -- feelings and habits associated with loyalty, identification, sympathy, legitimacy, virtue, respectability, representativeness, or the absence or reverse of these feelings, for one side or the other -- come to bear not in making coercion unnecessary, but in making it more effective and less costly, making it "stretch further."

On the side of effectiveness, the degree of impact of a given coercive act will depend on various of the subject's attitudes: toward the maker of the threat or promise; toward his organization and cause; toward the threatener's opponent and that opponent's local representatives and cause.

Thus, whether a particular peasant will pass on to A his observation of a tactical movement by R in return for a given material incentive will depend -- and depend rather sharply -- on the degree to which he feels he "ought," or "ought not" to help A. Likewise, it will depend on the degree to which he feels friendly to the particular local unit or official of A under threat, or on the contrary, wishes them harm; and the degree to which he feels identified with A's organization or cause, or R's, or neither. A high enough material incentive might wash out the effect of many moral or psychological inhibitions; yet a generally high level of prices, for a given budget, simply means less information forthcoming to A. (Threats can also be used to induce information; yet few governments other than Communist ones -- whether "free" or "police states" -- so orient their social structure toward mutual surveillance that it is feasible to



bring credible threats of punishment to bear against acts of "non-informing." Communist states do pay the social price to achieve that capability, with the result that they are peculiarly impervious to the growth of protracted insurgencies.)

### JUDO AS A CHOICE

In the light of the considerations above, to use resources to the ends of judo can be seen as an allocative choice by R, among alternative tactics aimed to affect behavior and its own "capital and prospects." R starts with a certain, small amount of arms, money, supplies, information, cadre, raw recruits; how shall it allocate or invest these so as to get more? Judo is only one among several approaches.

R can, for example:

- (1) Propagandize: use cadre to persuade P to give supplies, money, information, recruits;
- (2) Coerce, Barter: use weapons and recruits to threaten P, or offer help or security, to the same effect;
- (3) Filch: use recruits and weapons to overrun A's outposts, ambush A's patrols, to get more weapons;
- (4) Corrupt: with money and threats, buy weapons from A's outlying troops (or even, in larger lots, from A's armories).

The third and fourth tactics are forms of what Dennis Duncanson has termed "symbiotic insurgency," "the principle of getting control of part of the Government's own resources."\* Like judo, symbiosis

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\* Dennis J. Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam (London, 1968), p. 295. Under his heading of "symbiosis," Duncanson gives many examples of what is here analyzed as "judo," without making necessary distinctions and, I would say, without giving either proper explication or adequate importance to the latter phenomena. Tanham and Duncanson, "Some Dilemmas in Counterinsurgency," Foreign Affairs, October 1969, pp. 113-122, likewise emphasizes R's ability to "leech off...by purchase, theft, or capture" increments of supplies belonging to or provided by A (p. 120), which is clearly describable as "symbiotic" in a narrow sense. (In the same vein, see Wolf and Leites, op.cit., pp. 19-21, 26-27.) Analytically, and even in practice, this is distinguishable from judo

involves methods by which a weaker party "borrows strength" from a stronger adversary, so that escalation of the fighting by the Government increases the strength of the revolution.\* Thus, if the Government disperses weapons more widely to militia or hamlet defenses, many of these may be sold or lost to the rebels. If it distributes fertilizer and credit to gain peasants' sympathies, villagers may use increased income to pay higher "taxes" to (or "buy protection from") the rebels. In both cases, in contrast to judo, A's actions symbiotically strengthen the rebels without any change -- or even despite change favorable to A -- in P's political attitudes toward the Government (P's assets having been increased).

But while symbiosis may not involve P at all -- e.g., where R directly acquires A's weapons -- or may depend on improvement in P's lot, judo relies on actions by A that serve to antagonize P. Typically, these will be repressive measures, or defensive actions with oppressive effect. But in some cases they might be actions intended to win peasants' hearts, e.g., development projects that backfire because they increase rural income disparities, graft, and jealousies. Or they could be programs that are meant specifically to cut down on symbiosis: e.g., "resource control" programs that mainly generate corruption and extortion, strategic hamlet programs that force unwanted moves and uncompensated labor on villagers.

Without deprecating the importance of "symbiosis" as narrowly defined -- i.e., relating to processes in which, in contrast to judo, attitudinal changes in P need not figure -- we will not explore this concept here or its differences from judo. These differences can have, however, considerable significance for counterinsurgent policy. A government that is over-concerned with the dilemma posed by symbiosis -- "whatever improvements are made in social services, or however much outright bounty is distributed, it will be seen that the insurgents

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processes in which acts of A change P's disposition to trade or give up its own, given, assets and services to either A or R, in favor of R.

\* Duncanson, op.cit., p. 296.

are also benefited" -- is likely not to trust the rural population, whether with arms, increased income, more self-government, or reduced central intervention.

Such a government is likely to be especially vulnerable to judo tactics by R that lead to changes unfavorable to A in attitudes and response-patterns in P, such as:

(5) use R's recruits to raid or mortar A's outposts: inducing A to shell adjacent parts of P at night and run "sweeps" by day, accompanied by chicken-stealing, brutality, mass arrests, drafting, and rent-collection (not only in the immediate area, but elsewhere);

(6) use cadre efforts to induce, by propaganda or threats, members of P to put themselves in minor opposition to A -- by demonstrating against shellings or injustice, destroying or surrendering their ID cards, avoiding the draft, performing labor for R -- counting on A to respond over-harshly and "unjustly."

The first two tactics, direct coercion of P, promise little return while R's resources are still small and P is not yet sharply alienated from A. To a lesser extent, this is true as well for the "symbiotic" tactics. In both cases, the return to R is roughly proportionate to, or limited by, the costs and risks of its action.

Only the judo approach offers real "leverage": the possibility, at least, of reaction from A, effect on P, and ultimate advantage to R enormously disproportionate to R's initial effort and risk, and not restricted to the immediate locale or time period. There are special risks to judo, too, of course; it can fail, it can backfire in effect on P, it can provoke reaction from A or  $X_A$  that devastates both R and P. And like other "protracted war" strategies, it may suck in on  $X_A$ , just because the threat it seems to pose initially is so oblique and small, to invest so much prestige and effort over time in support of A that it will not withdraw even when it finds itself caught, with A, in a costly stalemate. Yet no other approach may offer so much, or enough, promise.

Specifically, it is probably the case that at any given time, in most countries of the world, the cost of achieving sufficient public participation to overthrow A by purely coercive measures -- not aimed as well at changing attitudes (the "climate of coercion") -- is beyond the capability to pay of any prospective R within that country. A serious R simply cannot afford to regard the "temperature of the water" as given or fixed (as Wolf and Leites might imagine).

R can and does strive to make the environment more hostile to the opponent, even if only marginally, whether or not it can make it less hostile to itself. And it is essential for R to do this. The urgency is evidenced, first, by the emphasis that successful R leaders place on this in their doctrinal writings, their guidance to subordinates, and above all in their actual practice; second, in the observation that successful R's have devoted great and effective attention to this task (or have benefited passively from favorable political attitudes) and unsuccessful R's, by and large, have not; third, from the general proposition (somewhat at odds with the tone of the Wolf-Leites discussion) that a successful rebellion is, in general, a very difficult and chancy matter, and few R's can afford to neglect any approach that improves their odds.

It is by no means only communists who use judo effectively, but an appreciation of the underlying premises of the approach comes very naturally to communist insurgents. As Vu Van Thai has pointed out (in discussion): those influenced by Marxism view war, politics, and negotiations as processes, taking time; with stages, a natural evolution, with contingencies to be exploited or deflected or recovered from in their course.

Policymaking in conflict is not, for communists, ever seen as a one-shot decision on a single program which is played out to the end. The process is expected -- indeed designed -- to produce changes within both parties. In particular, it is meant to exacerbate "contradictions" -- tensions, conflicts -- among the opposing allies and interests. It is necessary, then, that the conflict take enough time to operate on the opponents. And on one's own side! The communist expectation is that

neither side will be "the same" after a period of conflict. Their aim with respect to the opponent is not merely to counter his means, but to change him, and his relationship to his supporters; and to change one's own situation, and the organization of one's sources of support and relation to them, in large part using the stimulus and energy supplied by the opponent's actions. In short, their aim is to use conflict, in order, ultimately, to win it. Which is the purpose of judo.

The opportunity is there. In an insurgency situation, unlike most civil wars and wars between states, wholly committed supporters of R and A do not exhaust the population; appeals to the less-committed members of the opposition and of the uncommitted population can be based upon identifications, loyalties, and obligations; and one's efforts can produce increasing alienation or hostility toward the opponent. In these circumstances, R (or, indeed, A) has strong reason to work on such motivations -- in addition to manipulating individual incentives -- with the aims of: (1) inducing uncommitted members of P or less-committed members of the opposition to join as active, committed members (and, in the sense of gaining family and village tolerance, expanding the "recruiting base" for the growth of the organization); (2) gaining direct compliance from P, and lowering the cost of such compliance; (3) reducing compliance from P for the opponent and raising the costs to the opponent of gaining P's compliance.

Let us examine how revolutionary judo can serve each of these ends.

#### THE AIMS OF REVOLUTIONARY JUDO

##### Recruits

R's ability to recruit dedicated members is one of the key factors to benefit from successful judo. Thus in China, as K. C. Yeh recounts, four years of recruiting activities for the Chinese Communist Part prior to 1925 had brought increases in membership which "were relatively small compared to the period after 1925. The acceleration after the Fourth

Congress in 1925 was partly the result of the Party's intensified effort and partly the outcome of the wave of nationalism generated by the May Thirtieth Incident."<sup>\*</sup>

On May 30, 1925, the police in the British concession in Shanghai fired on a group of demonstrators protesting against the killing of a Chinese textile worker by the Japanese. Scores of persons were wounded or killed. The incident turned into a national movement against the Japanese and the British.

When the May-Thirtieth Incident occurred, the unions displayed unprecedented strength and unity in their struggle against the Western powers. Mass demonstrations and strikes spread from Shanghai to numerous other major cities in China. Although the strikes ended in a defeat, the political impact was great. The incident provided a powerful impetus to the revolutionary movement and demonstrated to the CCP leaders the importance of nationalism and how it could be exploited to help the cause of communism.

In particular, the May Thirtieth Incident "was particularly significant in bringing about the phenomenal growth in 1925-26. In less than a year, total membership increased thirty-fold";<sup>\*\*</sup> from 1,000 in May 1925, to 30,000 in July 1926 (the Party having started in July 1921 with 57 members).

Actions by A that dramatise, adversely, the goals and "character" of A -- in particular, its "distance" from and lack of concern for P -- affect not only the flows of recruits to R and P, but the outflows, in the form of desertions and defections. Moreover, they affect the morale, the sense of purpose, pride, dedication, elan, of the actual members of both sides, in ways that affect the competence, discipline, and coherence and thus the effectiveness of the opposing organizations. To the same effect, they influence the kinds of recruits -- in terms of dedication, patriotism, leadership ability -- accessible to each side. All these effects, of course, work in opposite directions for R and A, all -- if revolutionary judo is working -- to the detriment of A.

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<sup>\*</sup>K. C. Yeh, RM-6077-ARPA, "The Communist Revolutionary Strategy and the Land Problem, 1921-1927," p. 19.

<sup>\*\*</sup>Ibid., p. 21.

### Costs

However, the key importance of attitudes -- hence, of judo that stimulates "counterproductive" acts by A -- is not just with respect to the voluntary, active support of those "fully committed" on either side, i.e., the inputs that come free to one opponent or the other; either from the members of their organizations or from helpful elements of P. Such contributions are not the major part of the inputs for either side.. As Wolf and Leites emphasize throughout Rebellion and Authority: most help comes at a price. But what is the price? How adequate and effective is the help available for given Government resources? What are the annual and total costs to A, and to its external support ( $X_A$ ), of avoiding defeat, showing progress, approaching success?

The prices, quality of support, and thus, total costs for adequate support for each side -- not just the scale of uncoerced and unrecompensed "volunteer" services provided -- are crucially influenced by policies and actions of each side that affect attitudes: hostilities, loyalties, identifications, alienation, perceptions of opponents, allies and self, social goals and values.

It is not only the attitudes of those who are strongly committed to one side or the other that matter to the costs of revolution and counterrevolution. Nor is it the sole or even main target of political strategy to shift individuals from one committed camp to the other, or between just the three categories of these two plus the "uncommitted." This familiar three-way split is almost as misleading as a dichotomy -- "for us or against us" -- as a basis for appreciating the true potential or requirements of political action.

It is the whole spectrum of political attitudes, sympathies, perceptions, aversions -- and not a one-dimensional array, at that -- that counts toward the costs and the effectiveness of operations on both sides, and which may be potentially influenceable. This definitely includes the whole range of attitudes within the "uncommitted" mass, that part of the population that is not willing to incur high incremental risks for either side. And it means that differences of even

a few degrees in the temperature of the water, though they may not quickly affect the survival of the insurgent fish, can matter a great deal to the costs of pursuing them: and thus, ultimately, to the outcome.

This applies even to the recruiting processes mentioned above. Even "volunteers" do not truly come free; recruiting effort is still needed. (Note Yeh's reference above to the role, in increasing Party membership after the Fourth Congress in 1925, of "the Party's intensified effort" as well as to the nationalist attitudes intensified by the May Thirtieth Incident.) What depends partly on attitudes -- and this can be affected by A's "counterproductive" responses to R -- is the number of recruits, and their quality, that a given effort by R's cadres will bring in.\*

R's aim in changing attitudes is not only to lower the price to R of its inputs of men, supplies, labor, and information, but to raise the price to A of its needed inputs. This effect on costs is typically not a mere side-effect, an "additional burden" to A and to  $X_A$ , its external source of support; in many insurgencies it is absolutely central to the strategy, and the success, of the rebels in producing, first, a stalemate, and ultimately desertion of the cause and concessions by  $X_A$  and/or A.

How, after all, are insurgents to win?

They may hope to grow large enough ultimately to destroy the physical capability of the regime to oppose them (as in China). They may hope the regime will split apart, and give them an opening (as in South Vietnam, November, 1963); or that it will lose the support of its own instruments and the public so completely that it becomes a shell and collapses (Batista in Cuba). Yet when the opponent is a major colonial power, or when large-scale external support is available to the Government, none of these outcomes looks immediately feasible.

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\*"I can call spirits from the vasty deep."

"Why, so can I, and so can any man. But do they come when you do call for them?" Henry IV, Part I.



More specifically, suppose A has the following sort of support (which probably held for the Diem Government as of 1957):

- a. some hard-core support: say 10-20% and
- b. a large proportion -- 30-60% -- of the population not firmly against the Government, and
- c. significant external support.

Or suppose A simply has very strong external resources (e.g., A is a colonial power), or else, a very strong coercive apparatus.

In any of these cases, A cannot quickly be:

- a. deposed (by revolutionary forces);
- b. split, dissolved;
- c. defeated totally in military terms;
- d. deprived of a geographic (urban) base;
- e. deprived totally of coercive capability.

In fact, in physical terms, an A with these assets may remain stronger than R in military, administrative, and base capabilities til the end, or near the end; and R may, from the beginning, face this prospect.

What is possible in these cases, as a path to victory -- in part, because it increases the likelihood of each of the other developments above -- is to raise the price to the opponents of maintaining the effort and of achieving an adequate measure of success in suppressing R and maintaining their own authority. R's goal in such cases is to increase the costs of governing for A (psychological and political costs as well as material, both for A and  $X_A$ ), aiming to raise them higher than the local Government's ability, or the external supporter's willingness, to pay.

This goes considerably beyond simply presenting A with a stalemate, an inability totally to eliminate the rebel organization. Henry Kissinger's dictum, "The guerilla wins if he does not lose,"\* is an

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\*Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1969, p. 214. This premise does not, after all, seem to underly policy in the current Administration, which sometimes appears to have reverted to the belief of Kissinger's predecessor in office, W. W. Rostow: "the guerrilla loses if he does not win."

untrustworthy base for rebel hopes if it is taken literally, divorced from the question of the costs to A of continuing the conflict. Various guerrilla factions in Burma have, over the past twenty years, not lost; neither have they won. If the costs of a stalemate are low enough, and the stakes high enough, authorities can live with an "unpacified" region for a very long time, as the French did with respect to the Northern border areas in Indochina, or the British with frontier regions in India.

In general, the prospects of victory of a guerrilla force that can maintain a prolonged stalemate depend on (a) the costs to authority of continuing to stalemate and contain them, and (b) the significance of the "space" they occupy, considering this not only in terms of terrain but population, resources, the specific threats they pose, and the attention absorbed of local and overseas publics and of the government.

To say even that a moderately-costly stalemate favors R is to imply that the sources of A's support are more likely than R's to be discouraged by a failure to win (or even, perhaps, by too slow a process of attrition of the opponent). This may be; yet it would seem to hold mainly where A's main support is external (as in a colonial struggle, or South Vietnam). After all, a stalemate of "slow win" (or "slow loss") is likely to be much more comfortable for A than for R, in terms of day-to-day living.

The costs of a stalemate can seem too high for the supporters of authority only when the advantages of A's governing the country (instead of R) seem less than vital to them. This will apply mainly for a colonial power, or for X<sub>A</sub> (or for a very lightfooted leadership: e.g., Batista). Against more determined opposition -- as in Vietnam, 1946-70 -- R must do more than just stay alive; R must ensure that the costs of keeping it from winning loom large and irreducible for A and X<sub>A</sub>, and preferably, rising, the higher the better.

In certain circumstances, the underlying attitudes of P may be already an adequate base for this strategy: very likely as the result of earlier judo involving the same or even a different opponent. Thus, P's attitudes toward the French in Tonkin by 1953, or in Algeria in

1961, after generations of French rule and years of open conflict, were such as to assure high costs for French efforts without further stimulus.

In these cases, no further judo is necessary. A can act efficiently and prudently, losing no further sympathy, and still lose. But if strong antipathy to A (or sympathy for R) is limited to a small minority, then attitudes must change, if the effort is to be made costly to A. And if, as is typically also the case, R's resources and personnel for coercion and persuasion are small, then R must induce, or rely upon, the Government, with its far greater reach and resources, to do most of the work of alienating the masses and organized groups. The insurgents must hope and plan for the Government to act in such a way as to increase the price and total costs to itself of acquiring popular collaboration, of carrying out operations effectively, and of denying popular collaboration to the insurgents. Likewise, the Government and its allies, with their greater access and visibility to the outside world, must do the main work of alienating foreign opinion, especially in the home public of the supplying power; so that in the light of high costs, ambivalent attitudes, and low prospects of "victory," external support will be limited, then withdrawn.

This was the path toward victory for the insurgents in the early parts of the First Indochina War, Algeria, Palestine, Cyprus; and it was an essential precursor to victorious conflict to India, Yugoslavia, and China. It was aborted or countered in Malaya and the Philippines. It had led, by 1964, to near-victory in South Vietnam, and provided the basis for costly stalemate even against U.S. forces in 1966-68.

#### COMMUNIST JUDO IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1954-64

By 1956-57, after harsh "land reform" in the North and Diem's consolidation in the South, strong sympathy and support for the communists in South Vietnam was probably limited to a small minority.\* However, the very existence of communist organization as a threat (1954-58) and

\*In contrast to the earlier putative majority sympathy for the Viet Minh leadership -- as leaders of the liberation struggle against the French -- in Tonkin (Northern Vietnam) in 1947-54, and even in South Vietnam after Geneva, through 1954-55.

the onset and growth of violent pressure (1959-64), added to the challenge of non-communist opposition to the Government, served as catalyst to a dynamic process, weakening and limiting the capabilities of the GVN (Government of Vietnam, the Saigon regime) and progressively denying it the cooperation of both organized and unorganized elements of the population, while increasing cooperation, during this period at least, for the Viet Cong. GVN actions (with U.S. support) provided most of the energy in this process. This is not to deny that communist-led insurgency would have been likely to emerge, at some point, nor that with North Vietnamese support it could have attained major scale, eventually, even without "cooperation" from the GVN. Yet GVN policies, by their inadvertent political effects, were probably crucial to the timing of the onset, the rate of growth, the scale achieved by 1963, the effectiveness of active VC guerilla insurgency, and the costs and difficulties of opposing it. That is to say a good deal.

The threat specifically from the communists provided immediate stimulus for GVN responses that had highly counterproductive aspects for the GVN strategically: alienating both rural and urban masses from the GVN, generating recruits, information and cooperation for the VC, and making VC pressures on the peasants more acceptable and effective (even without, necessarily, inducing positive sympathy for the VC).

The following list indicates some of these "communist successes," i.e., GVN practices serving communist interests, and induced in part by the communists:

1. GVN "anti-communist" arrests (especially 1956-60) and threat of arrest: a process of "self-fulfilling accusations," driving former Viet Minh and others accused back into the jungles and the organization.
2. ARVN deployment in the countryside and entry into villages, bringing looting, brutality, arrogance: a major issue of resentment against the GVN.
3. Use of ARVN and RF/PF to protect the return of landlords and to collect rents: causing resentment (especially where the Viet Minh or Viet Cong had previously abolished rents or

- "given" ownership to tenants), emphasizing a class basis of the conflict, and making VC bonds and taxes acceptable.
4. GVN artillery fire on hamlets (and rough handling of ensuing, often NLF-organized, "protest demonstrations").
  5. Corvee labor schemes and resettlement (agrovilles, strategic hamlets) 1958-63, without regard for harvesting schedules, villagers' desires or needs, and without promised or adequate compensation.
  6. GVN draft: creating resentment, producing draft dodgers as VC recruits, and creating acceptance of VC "draft."
  7. "Resource control" on roads and bridges by poorly trained and paid police, resulting mainly in an irritating burden of corrupt "taxation."

At the same time, the pressure of the insurgency strengthened certain inherent political and administrative tendencies of the Diem regime and its successors -- trends which also owed important stimulus to the challenge of non-communist opposition to the GVN -- that likewise had major counterproductive aspects, limiting and weakening the capabilities of the regime in trying to assure its continued control by a narrow faction:

1. The development of an autocratic (but inefficient) police state.
2. Refusal to broaden participation in the government, either at national or local levels: excluding and alienating most elites, denying the regime administrative talent and leadership.
3. Refusal to draw on ex-members of the anti-French resistance movement.
4. Reliance instead upon administrative and military elements associated with the colonial or puppet regime, with their limitations, weaknesses and onus.
5. Refusal, under Diem, to conciliate the Sects, after their armed challenge had been reduced.
6. Reliance upon, but suspicion of, Army support; hence,

measures to assure loyalty, rather than competence, among Army commanders; frequent shifts in command, and refusal to delegate operational control; and unwillingness to press ARVN to reform itself or to take casualties.

7. Over-reliance upon, and "unfair" rewards to, Catholic and Northern refugee elements loyal to the ruling family.
8. Increasing centralization of control among most-trusted elements, family and friends.
9. Unwillingness to tolerate, conciliate, or negotiate with any organized structures (e.g., Sects, parties, unions), especially in an opposition role: hence, great vulnerability to a major organized or mass protest, like the Buddhist Struggles of 1963 and 1966, in the absence of organizational allies or support.
10. Militarization and emphasis upon loyalty (with little delegation of power and frequent shifts) of provincial administration and police: at great cost in competence and rapport with the public.
11. Preoccupation of the regime with the threats to its maintenance in office -- not only from communists but from non-communists, ARVN, or U.S. -- at the cost of attention to reform or positive long-run goals or programs.
12. Reliance upon the United States, at the cost of supporting communist "puppet" charges, and in fact (after 1965), at the cost of inability to influence the United States toward discriminate use of firepower. (Thus, along with (6) above, limited ability of the GVN to protect the population not only from the VC but -- more importantly, for the masses -- from ARVN or the United States). (Note: This was drafted before the recent example of President Thieu's deprecation of the My Lai massacre.)

THE IMPACT OF JUDO IN VIETNAM

The impact of all the developments in Vietnam described above can be seen in a variety of ways:

(a) Denying the GVN willing cooperation from both the organized and unorganized population -- information freely given, volunteers for the Army and militia, adherence of dedicated activists -- and increasing it for the communists. More generally, reducing the information, recruits, effort available to the GVN for a given inducement, positive or negative.

(b) Reducing the dedication, morale, enthusiasm of both civil and military elements of the regime, and their sense of acting with the sympathy and serving the interests of the mass of the population. Hence, worsening discipline and effectiveness and encouraging misbehavior, desertion and corruption.

(c) Reducing the effectiveness (e.g., in finding the enemy, or willingness to operate at night, pursue contact, or take casualties) of military operations. Likewise for civil administration: e.g., by lowering the levels of experience, competence, rapport with the local population, discipline, initiative, delegated power and honesty.

(d) Stimulating organized non-communist opposition to the regime. at various times distracting, provoking, destroying or paralyzing the GVN.

(e) Losing, by the spectacle of repression, ineffectiveness, instability, and lack of public support, the sympathy and willingness to support the effort of the U.S. domestic public.

The first three effects above (a-c) are reflected in reduced effectiveness of given policies and operations; and in increases in the cost, in psychological and political as well as in financial, manpower, and casualty terms, of achieving given objectives. Hence, with given resources, these effects reduce the feasible scale of operations and their overall impact, and eventually discourage A's supporters from providing additional resources or continuing the effort.

The fourth category of effects (d) must be seen as affecting not only the cost but the physical obtainability of success. The very threat of active non-communist opposition (e.g., the Caravellists' manifesto in early 1960<sup>\*</sup>) added to the initial pressures of the communists insurgency in encouraging preoccupation of the regime with threats to its stability and strengthening all of the oppressive, counter-productive responses listed earlier. When these led to actual outbreaks against the regime -- the Thi coup of 1960, Buddhist Struggles of 1963 and 1966, ARVN overthrow of Diem in 1963, student/Buddhist/Catholic riots in 1964-65, FULRO Montagnard uprising 1964, the various ARVN coups of 1964 on -- efforts against the communists were limited, reduced, or broke down completely. The administrative structure was, each time, temporarily paralyzed and personnel were widely shifted. In-between-times, the expectation of such instability had a generally paralyzing effect. This factor alone -- the impact of actual or anticipated non-communist opposition -- has been enough virtually to nullify, periodically, all progress against the communists. (Yet it has rarely been addressed as a specific problem by the U.S. Government, except in the form of unfulfilled hopes that increased military and economic aid and improved military effectiveness would serve to lessen non-communist opposition to the regime.)

Meanwhile, the efforts of successive Saigon regimes to divide, disorganize, paralyze and repress non-communist opposition groups were successful enough (most competitors to the tightly-organized, clandestine communists being considerably more vulnerable to police suppression and to corruption) to reduce or eliminate these as rivals to the communists, alternative foci of nationalist support. This assured the VC that if the GVN should collapse, they would be the main beneficiaries; and in the meantime, that they would provide the only leadership for those moved to active, violent opposition to the regime.

This aspect of judo -- relying on or stimulating A to destroy alternative Rs -- has been crucial to communist leadership of rebel

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\* For text, see Bernard Fall, The Two Vietnams, p.



forces in Indochina at a number of stages even prior to 1954, including:

- (a) French destruction of the VNQDD after the Yen Bay revolt in 1930;\*
- (b) the disarming of the French by the Japanese, March 9, 1945 (in part stimulated by guerrilla sabotage encouraged by the French);\*\*
- (c) arrest by French or Chinese authorities of various rivals denounced by the communists.\*\*\* In continuing this process from 1954 to the present, Diem and his successors have excluded from power most of those Vietnamese (including non-communist former members of the Viet Minh, and Buddhist and union leadership) with the talent, experience, credentials or following to have provided the GVN with a mass base or to have understood and countered effectively NLF strategy.

As for (e), the effect of GVN repression and evident unpopularity upon sympathy in the U.S., this once was a crucial factor -- in 1965 -- in the destruction of a GVN administration stronger than any of its successors. It could happen again.

#### JUDO: THE VIEW FROM A AND X<sub>A</sub>

To say that revolutionary judo has been at work is to say, among other things, that the responses of P to the actions, the declarations, the threats and promises of R and A are no longer what they were; that P now shows a pattern of response more favorable to the interests of R; and that this change (reflecting changes in P's attitudes, perceptions and evaluations of the contending parties and their relation to P) has

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\* John T. McAlister, Jr., Vietnam, The Origins of Revolution, (Princeton, 1969): "But with the sudden elimination of the VNQDD by the reprisals of the colonial authorities, serious competition to the communists ceased to exist..." (p. 93).

\*\* Ibid, pp. 112-113.

\*\*\* "When Ho Chi Minh arrived in Canton in June, 1925 as an agent for the Comintern...his first task was to cause the arrest of Phan Boi Chau, the living symbol of the traditionalist protest against French rule." (Ibid, p. 83) When groups formerly allied with Chau formed the Tan Viet party, the founders of the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930 "succeeded in having the Tan Viet leaders arrested and in assuming control over their provincial organization." (Ibid, p. 87)

been brought about largely by actions of A (typically, stimulated by actions of R). It is to say that, for these reasons, A's own performance has caused R to become larger, more effective and challenging, more dedicated, less vulnerable, by making elements in P more receptive than before to given appeals and pressures by R, more aware of congruences between their own interests and desires and those of R (particularly as these involved the destruction of A's rule), and vice versa with respect to A.

Obviously, such results of A's behavior conflict with A's self-interest. For judo to work, it is essential that A not foresee (or at least, not act upon foreknowledge of) such outcomes as the consequence of its actions and reactions. A must act, in effect, "blindly," be "stupid," "clumsy," unlearning in these matters, ignorant of linkages. A must, it would appear, be unaware: of political "side-effects," of the ability of an organized and alert R to exploit them, of recurrent, ominous patterns in stimuli to which it is responding routinely or ad hoc.

Che Guevara and Regis Debray came at some point to believe that the process of active rebellion, by itself, and terrorism in particular, could create the popular support R needed. This is, probably, true primarily when A can be harnessed to the process appropriately by revolutionary judo. That possibility is often among the true "preconditions for revolution." If A won't "cooperate," if (as in Bolivia or in the Philippines under Magsaysay) it suppresses tendencies to alienate the population under R's stimulus, R's efforts alone will not rouse P to take enough risks. This is especially so for R's terror tactics alone (as with the OAS in Algeria) which neither in themselves give R legitimacy nor undermine A's: on the contrary. If these are to have a useful effect it must probably be, in the first instance, on A's own behavior. A must show promise as a victim of judo.

A contrary theory of the timing of the renewal of terrorism and insurgency in South Vietnam (1958-59), presented in official USG White Papers, is that Diem's success in consolidation and development had made him a threat to be countered by Hanoi. But the interpretation

avored by many non-Communist Vietnamese, as well as by the NLF, is that Diem encouraged (and necessitated) such measures by demonstrating, over 1956-59, his tendencies to repel even potential support and to alienate the uncommitted by indiscriminate repression, even without, but especially with provocation. Thus, he had shown, by his "willingness to respond appropriately" from the point of view of the VC, vulnerability to judo tactics. The final unveiling, officially, of the NLF came just one month after the abortive Thi coup of November 1960 had confirmed conclusively both widespread disaffection and Diem's unawareness and intransigence in dealing with it.

Anthony Russo has suggested\* (for South Vietnam) that where A operates on R, or tries to, R "operates on the social system in such a way that it generates, dynamically, inputs for R as R needs them; it shakes the black box of the society and gets recruits out." But this proposition might well be modified: R mainly relies upon, or induces, A to operate on the social system, unwittingly, to this effect. To achieve this, R must understand\*\* better than A -- or at least, manage better to exploit -- the dynamics of the social system, including that part of the system that serves, supports, and constitutes A. R must understand that system in a very realistic and complex manner, foreseeing, so as to utilize, not just gross aspects of its mechanism, but local peculiarities (in Vietnam, the peculiar properties of the "43 province wars"), and properties that simple models of the social system (relied on by A) neglect as mere "side-effects," "frictions," "leakages," or long-run indirect linkages.

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\* In discussion.

\*\* Or somehow act as if it understands, perhaps by simple imitation of revolutionary models elsewhere (examples ignored by A). See the propagation among student rebels of effective judo tactics against college administrations in the United States, 1968-69, a "domino" effect, resulting from great and growing disparity between R's and A's in knowledge of the process, self-awareness, and willingness to learn from the examples of others.

R may be helped by a better theory than A of A's own propensities, its likely responses to a revolutionary situation and to the stimuli R provides, and their impact on the conflict. And R may be better aware than A itself of the actions A's own representatives are actually carrying out, and the ways these actions and representatives are perceived and judged by P. Such conditions, it turns out, are frequently met. R will often be, by background and/or the enforced conditions of rural insurgency, "closer" to P than is the urban-based leadership of A, and better placed to perceive the actual field operations of A's forces and officials and their impact on P.

#### A AS BLIND SLAVE

Nevertheless, the overall effect of a successful judo campaign is paradoxical, ironic, puzzling: both to A, and to an observer, who not only sees the weak frustrating or defeating the strong, but, if he looks closer, sees A apparently cooperating, suicidally, to this effect.

Thus, since the fall of Diem, just as before, the appearance of purposiveness in GVN/US behavior in the "pursuit" of communist ends (see preceding section) has been so marked and consistent as to have led one observer, Richard Critchfield, to believe that Prime Minister Ky and other Northern junta members were acting under the discipline of Le Duan, Secretary-General of the Communist Party in North Vietnam.\* This hypothesis provides an excellent fit to the data of observed behavior, even though it is almost surely wrong; Critchfield does not seem to notice that the data would be equally consistent with the corresponding hypotheses that Diem, or successive American Presidents and commanders, were disciplined communists.

Such paradoxes are neither infrequent nor accidental. They are the rule and essence of insurgencies using judo. The point is that R, if it is to win, must often be able to count on producing or benefiting by just such "counter-productive" behavior by A as well fit this conspiratorial hypothesis of deliberate sabotage of A's own cause.

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\* The Long Charade (New York, 1968)

The bizarre, off-key aspect may be conveyed by a mechanical analogy, from the field of cybernetics, which deals with communication and control in "purposive," self-regulating "servo-systems."

"'Control' is a special kind of relation between two machines or parts of machines, such that one part regulates the operation of the other. The master gives the orders and the slave (servus) does the work. The essential point is that the source of energy is dissociated from the source of instructions... Mechanical control is a relationship which brings to mind the story of the lame man leading the blind. One of the partners can see and decide what should be done but has scarcely any strength, while the other has strength but lacks information."\*

An observer of such a system might not be able to comprehend the content of the control signals, or foresee the goal/equilibrium toward which the system tended; but he could infer its nature as a control system and distinguish the roles of the components by the disparities in critical energy-flows, "The control signal requires only a very small amount of power, often quite negligible, but this negligible amount is vital, as with yeast or a catalyst."\*\*


R, using judo, acts as a controller in a servo-system in which A and P are the main sources of energy. An observer could well interpret the low-energy "input" from R to A -- e.g., assassinations of officials, attacks on small outposts, demonstrations, sniper fire from a village at a helicopter -- as "signals" or "commands" that cause large-energy responses from A operating on P (e.g., in the latter case, an air strike on the village), which, in turn, cause significant flows of support from P to R, while increasing P's resistance (the price, timeliness and competence of P's compliance) to A's demands. Both of these effects of A's actions "serve the purpose" of assuring R's survival and growth.

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
\* G. T. Guilband, What is Cybernetics? (New York, 1959), pp. 11-12. Guilband's text actually refers to "the story of the blind man leading the lame," which I take to be a mistake, though it brings to mind the story of alliance relationships in Vietnam, SEATO, and NATO.

\*\* Ibid, p. 13.


The basic dynamics of judo can be shown by the following circuit diagram, where the width of the arrows indicates the size of the energy-flow, the sign indicates a supportive (+) or destructive/repressive/antagonizing (-) act, and the numbers show sequence of effects:



The corresponding flow-chart for "symbiosis" may be similar, except for a positive rather than negative flow from A to P:



By contrast, although Wolf and Leites, in their text, give examples of symbiosis, their Figure 1\* showing a flow-chart for the support system of insurgency amounts to the following:



In other words, as noted in the preface, their abstract analysis ignores the possibility of a link from A to P -- positive or negative, corresponding to symbiosis or judo -- so that A is "wired in" as a vital part of the process sustaining the viability and growth of R. Support for R from P is shown solely as a result of transactions between R and P, acts of coercion, persuasion or exchange initiated by R. A appears only as a target of R's "outputs", not as a means for acting on P, conditioning P to be more forthcoming in interaction with R. This omission (which commonly models appropriately A's understanding of the conflict process) leads directly to distorted or crucially incomplete interpretations of the process and to misdirected policies for A.

Actually, virtually everything that has been said for R's opportunities and needs for acting on P through its opponent applies to both sides in the conflict, i.e., to A as well, with very close parallelism. But A is less likely than R to recognize this.

At first glance, the resources available to A from  $X_A$  -- particularly where  $X_A$  is the United States -- in combination with A's vastly greater command of internal resources compared to R, might seem to make the cost-cutting problem less urgent for A in its pursuit of counter-rebellion. But resources must be matched against tasks, and A's need for inputs from P is actually far greater than that of R. A's forces of all sorts are and must be larger, as well as A's administrative structure, and (in part because of the different social strata from which A draws its recruits and officers) the materiel requirements to feed, clothe, shelter and equip its agents is far greater than for R, man for man. Moreover, if A is to exploit its potential advantages in vehicular mobility and firepower, materiel requirements for these purposes are very great (though these needs may be largely met by  $X_A$ ).

At the same time, the effectiveness of A's operations is potentially affected by the behavior of P almost to the same extent as for R. It makes a great deal of difference both to the costs and the effectiveness of A's efforts whether peasants fortify their villages to impede the advance of A troops or conversely, to resist penetration by R; whether they inform R of every tactical move by A's units, or conversely (or indeed, also) inform A of the whereabouts of the identity of R's agents and the whereabouts of R's units; whether they spend the night digging trenches in the road or and, spend days filling up such trenches or improving defenses around A's outposts; whether the young men hide in the jungle to avoid R's "recruiters" or A's, or both.

Both to gain recruits, swelling its forces and officialdom, and to gain compliance from P, A can and does rely upon individualistic incentives, and for this purpose A has greater resources to draw upon than does R. Nevertheless, given the scale of the requirements, A cannot at all be indifferent to the price it must pay for adequate compliance and inputs, any more than R.

Indeed, a stalemated or losing A is likely to feel its failure very largely in terms of inadequate resources, of too few units to protect its bases and pursue the enemy, of the incentives it offers being too low to hold or attract recruits (i.e., to prevent desertions and produce enlistments), or to elicit adequate performance from its instruments. It is, in fact, precisely this situation that R aims to generate.

Moreover, contrary to the impression given in Rebellion and Authority some parts of R's strategy to do so does not consist merely of increasing its own inputs and thus confronting A with an ever-growing challenge. That is part of the strategy, surely, but an equally important aim for R in most cases is to increase the price to A both of cooperation from P and of adequate performance by its own instruments. And R does this not only by its choice of tactics but by working to influence the political attitudes that underly the terms on which A draws inputs from P and compliance from its own agents: What Wolf and Leites might call the "supply of counter-rebellion."

Thus, R is not interested alone in reducing the costs and increasing the effectiveness of its own operation, but also, and just as urgently, in increasing the cost and reducing the effectiveness of A's operations. And the path to both of these aims lies through the political attitudes of P: not just that part of P that is a potential supplier of direct support to R, but also that part of P on which A relies for actions of direct support. There is, in fact, great overlap between these subsets of P, and between them they comprise virtually the whole population.

Moreover -- another point considerably neglected by Wolf and Leites, and a crucial one -- to the extent that A relies on  $X_A$  for an important part of its resources, and to the extent that the terms and extent of X's support depends upon the consent of X's population (as when  $X_A$  is the U.S.), the political attitudes toward A and R of that foreign population are also of great concern to R, and a target of its manipulation. (This has been a major factor in the strategy of the Viet Cong and DRV, particularly since 1965, and seems often to be regarded as a sneaky,



unmilitary, almost cowardly strategem; yet it is only part of the general strategy whereby R aims to influence the terms and overall availability of access to resources and cooperation for A.)

It is in these terms -- the importance of the manipulation of political attitudes to gain recruits and compliance and deny them to the opponent -- that such wars are in large part "political" for both sides. To say this is not, or should not be, to deprecate the importance of military tactics, administrative and coercive efficiency, and other dimensions of strategy and operations upon both sides. Arguments over whether the war is "primarily" political or military are dangerously misleading, for they foster a one-dimensional view of the war that has often been disastrous for policy. Neither A nor R can afford to consider that one such element of policy or tactics is "primary" and then precede to base policy almost exclusively upon that factor. The fact is that more than one consideration is typically critical; the essential thing to perceive is that both political aspects, as described above, and military aspects, along with public administrative aspects, are typically of the highest importance.

Although this is true for both sides, the basic asymmetry between R and A does lead to differences in their relative perception of the relative importance of political activity and especially its urgency. With its initial weakness and vulnerability, and its small resources for coercion, R needs at least a minimally favorable configuration of attitudes in order to survive at any level above the lowest. To survive and grow it must pay all the more urgent attention to such attitudes: e.g., in deciding the feasibility of entering "Phase II," in picking the locations of base areas at early operations (this was one of Ché Guevara's mistakes in Bolivia) and in determining its operations.

A, on the other hand, typically need pay no attention at all to popular attitudes merely in order to survive and operate for a prolonged period. Its coercive command over internal resources and ability to call on external resources enables it to survive for a considerable time even against wide-spread and intense public hostility.

It is commonly, indeed, of great importance and often strictly essential for A to affect political attitudes favorably if it is in the end to win, i.e., to contain, suppress and destroy the Rebels; or even, in the long run, to avoid its own defeat. But the lesser urgency of the requirement makes this aspect of policy less salient for A, especially in the early stages; and in the later stages, A may perceive it as being "too late" to address this problem. And so it may be. And so A loses; or drags X<sub>A</sub> into ruinous stalemate.